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ARGUMENTS
I.

THERECORDINDICATESTHATTHETRIALCOURT
- DUE TO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE - ERRED IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT.

The State claims that the trial court "properly denied" Defendant's motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. See
Brief of Appellee, p. 13. According to the State, "the intent as to each charge could be
inferred from the evidence." See id. The record demonstrates that the State's argument is
without merit.
Once a motion for directed verdict is made, the trial court's inquiry is to be guided
by the elements of the crime as defined by the applicable statutory provisions establishing
and defining the offense. See State v. Bossert, 2015 UT App 275, ~ 18, 362 P.3d 1258. In
reviewing the challenge to a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the reviewing court
accordingly examines the evidence introduced at trial and compares it to the statutory
elements of the applicable offense. Id.

A.

at~

19.

The Burglary Charge Insufficiency

The Burglary statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n actor is guilty of burglary
who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to
commit ... a felony [or] ... theft .... " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )(a) & (b ). 1 As

1

A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 is attached to the Brief of
Appellant as Addendum F.
1

pertaining to this case, the elements of Burglary are: ( 1) the act of entering the building,
and (2) the specific intent to commit a felony or theft therein. See id. "The act of entering
alone does not give rise to an inference that the actor entered with the requisite intent to
constitute burglary." State v. Brooks, 631P.2d878, 881(Utah1981). The intentto commit
a felony or theft must be proved or shown from circumstances by which the intent may
reasonably be inferred. See Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1978). Moreover, it
is the intent to commit a theft, not the actual theft, which is material. See Brooks, 631 P.2d
at 881. 2
"Since the intent to commit a theft is a state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of
direct proof, it can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of
human behavior and experience." Brooks, 631 P.2d at 881; see also State v. Hopkins, 11
Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486, 487 (1961). An "inference" is defined as:
a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact
in a case, not presented by direct evidence as to the existence
of the fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other
facts from which, by a process oflogic and reason, based upon
common experience, the existence of the assumed fact may be
concluded by the trier of the fact.
Wyattv. Baughman, 121Utah98, 109, 239P.2d193 (1951).

In cases where there may be an actual stealing, the intention may be more readily
apparent, however, the failure to commit a theft, after entry with the intent, is no defense
to the crime of burglary. See State v. Baldwin, 29 Utah 2d 318, 509 P.2d 350, 351 (1973).
2

2

The surrounding circumstances, such as the manner of entry, the odd hour, and the
sudden flight upon being discovered, supports the inference that the required intent to
commit theft or a felony was present. See Brooks, 631 P.2d at 881. In other words, the
intent to commit theft may be sufficiently established by circumstances such as "the manner
of entry, the time of day, the character and contents of the building, the person's actions
after entry, the totality of the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation."

State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the record demonstrates a lack of evidence that shows, or even
supports a reasonable inference that Mr. Carrick - assuming he had unlawfully entered or
remained in the house - intended to commit theft. The testimony of the State's witnesses
indicates a lack of furtive behavior in the course entering and exiting the house (see, e.g.,
R. 329-30; R. 409). The evidence and surrounding circumstances also included, among
other things, the following: ( 1) the person approaching and entering the house did so in a
nonfurtive manner (see e.g., R. 327-28); (2) the entry took place in the afternoon after
April's funeral (see, e.g., R. 323-24); (3) the manner of entry- and exit-were done with
a lack of burglarious intent (see, e.g., R. 324; R. 365-66; R. 387; R. 334; R. 377); and (4)
Mr. Carrick did not attempt to hide or conceal himself at or during the funeral (see, e.g., R.
319; R. 363 ). In addition - none of the witnesses provided any testimony that the person
had been seen carrying anything from the house. In fact, Mr. Taylor testified that he - after
reviewing the contents of the house on the day of the incident - did not notice anything

3

missing (R. 444: 19-24). Approximately five months later-he again told the investigating
officer that he "couldn't find anything missing from [the] home" (R. 453:2-6).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence was
sufficiently inconclusive so that reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Carrick intended to commit theft. See & cf Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(1 ). 3
There was insufficient evidence to submit this issue to the jury. The assertion by the
prosecution that the State intended to argue the issue of intent at closing further
demonstrates the insufficient evidence regarding the intent to commit theft. Thus, the trial
court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict on this issue at the close of the
State's case.

B.

The Criminal Trespass Charge Insufficiency

In its Brief, the State argues that "the jurors could reasonably infer from the evidence
that Defendant unlawfully entered his deceased lover's home in reckless disregard that his
presence would cause fear for the safety of another." See Brief of Appellee, p. 19. The
State's argument fails to substantively rebut Mr. Carrick's argument that there was

A person engages in conduct "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103( 1). See Addendum H attached to the Brief of Appellant.
3

4

insufficient evidence that he entered the home in reckless disregard that his presence would
cause fear for the safety of another. 4
To convict Mr. Carrick of Criminal Trespass, the State had to prove that he entered
or remained unlawfully in the home and that he was "reckless as to whether his presence
[would] cause fear for the safety of another . . . ."

See Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-206(2)(a)(iii). 5 Even assuming that Mr. Carrick had unlawfully entered the house,
there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that he was reckless
in the manner so required. A person, according to Utah law, engages in conduct
Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(3).
When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State, it demonstrates
that Mr. Carrick's alleged behavior in entering and exiting the house was not reckless as to

The State contends that because Mr. Carrick was not convicted of the lesserincluded offense of Criminal Trespass, he was not prejudiced by the trial court's denial on
the lesser charge. See Brief of Appellee, p. 19. However, this issue is likely to reappear
in the event that this Court reverses Mr. Carrick's conviction and remands the case for a
new trial.
4

A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 is attached to the Brief of
Appellant as Addendum G.
5

5

whether his presence would cause fear for the safety of another. The careful manner in
which he allegedly entered and exited the house is in stark contrast to even a colloquial
definition of the word "reckless." (See R. 450:18-20 (Mr. Taylor testifying that the screen
was "completely intact"); see also R. 459-60 (investigating officer testifying that "very
seldom" will a screen be replaced or "stuff' not taken during a burglary)). None of the
State's witnesses testified concerning a fear for their safety in the course of Mr. Carrick
allegedly entering and exiting the house. At the very most, there may have been some
suspicion but nothing constituting a fear for their safety or that of another (see R. 327-28
(Starkey testifying that she "actually waved to him" and "he waved back")).
Nothing the State presented established that Mr. Carrick' s alleged conduct indicated
that he - from his perspective - was aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his presence would cause fear for the safety of another. Perhaps, most
significantly, there was no evidence introduced that would allow a reasonable inference that
Mr. Carrick's alleged conduct constituted a risk of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under those circumstances.
According to the court's rationale, a person's unlawful entry or remaining on the
property is presumptively reckless as to causing fear for the safety of another (see R. 49596). The court's rationale thus created a prohibitively narrower reading of the elements to
prove Criminal Trespass than that intended by the Legislature. The plain language of the

6

Criminal Trespass statute provides, "A person is guilty of criminal trespass if ... the person
enters or remains unlawfully on property and . .. is reckless as to whether his presence will
cause fear for the safety of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis
added). The trial court's ruling effectively eliminated the culpable mental state as an
element of the offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2)(b) (dictating that "the culpable
mental state required" for the offense constitutes an "element of the offense"). This
violates the established principle of statutory construction that requires the reviewing court,
when interpreting statutory language, to "presume that the Legislature used each word
advisedly," giving "effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."

State v. Terwilliger, 1999 UT App 337, ~ 10, 992 P.2d 490 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The trial court's interpretation also violates the principle that '"any
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be
avoided.'"

State v. Hunt, 906 P .2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United States v.

Rawlings, 821F.2d1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987)).
In light of the foregoing, a reasonable jury could not have found that the elements
of Criminal Trespass had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court erred
by reading the Criminal Trespass statute too narrowly. Consequently, the trial court erred
by denying Mr. Carrick's motion for a directed verdict on the Criminal Trespass charge.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE DEFINITION OF

7

THE CULPABLE MENTAL STATE ELEMENT OF
BOTH BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
The State argues that Mr. Carrick's "plain error claim fails under the invited error
doctrine." See Brief of Appellee, p. 31 et seq. However, the State's argument fails because
the facts of the instant case demonstrate that defense counsel did not lead the trial court into
committing the error.
The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to '"discourage[ ] parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on
appeal.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ~ 54, 70 P .3d 111 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)).
In addition, "'it fortifies [the] long-established policy that the trial court should have the
first opportunity to address the claim of error."' Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220).
The State - in propounding its argument- relies exclusively on our supreme court's
decision in State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 86 P .3d 742. Geukgeuzian was charged with
tampering with a witness and with making a false written statement. Id. at~ 3. During trial,
Geukgeuzian proposed a jury instruction that recited almost verbatim the elements of the
witness tampering statute. Id. The State also submitted a proposed instruction that tracked
the statutory elements. Id.

at~

4. However, neither instruction provided the requisite

culpable mental state. Id. Relying on the proposed instructions, the trial court gave a jury
instruction very similar to that proposed by Geukgeuzian and the State with no separate

8

mens rea requirement. Id.

Geukgeuzian did not object to the instruction and was

subsequently found guilty of tampering with a witness. Id.
On appeal, Geukgeuzian argued that the trial court erred by failing to include the
mens rea requirement in its jury instruction. This court agreed, reasoning that the trial
court's failure resulted in manifest injustice. Id. at, 5. On certiorari, the supreme court
reversed. The Court reasoned that "[w]hile a party who fails to object to or give an
instruction may have an instruction assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception,
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e), 'a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when
that party led the trial court into committing the error."' Id. at, 9 (citing Anderson, 929
P.2d at 1109 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation
omitted)). In addition, the Court stated the following:
We acknowledge that Geukgeuzian' s failure to include a
separate mens rea element in his proposed instruction was most
likely inadvertent and not a conscious attempt to mislead the
trial court. Nevertheless, we believe that, like those cases
discussed above, his proposed jury instruction effectively led
the trial court into adopting the erroneous jury instruction that
he now challenges on appeal. Contrary to his assertions before
this court, Geukgeuzian did not simply omit a mens rea
element; rather, he affirmatively purported to list all "essential
elements" needed to prove that an individual tampered with a
witness. Accordingly, we find that Geukgeuzian invited the
trial court's erroneous jury instruction and reverse the court of
appeals' decision below.
Id. at, 12.

9

Unlike Geukgeuzian, Mr. Carrick's counsel did not provide the trial court with any
proposed jury instructions. Rather, the State submitted proposed jury instructions on
elements of Burglary and Criminal Trespass, which did not provide the requisite mental
state element for either offense (R. 66-67). Consequently, defense counsel's conduct is
more akin to a failure to object rather than the more affirmative manner discussed in

Geukgeuzian. Moreover, the trial court was aware of the intent or mental state issues and
deliberately addressed the issues in its ruling on the motion for a directed verdict. See &

cf Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ~~ 23-24, 164 P .3d 366.

III.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE
LACK OF INSTRUCTION AS TO THE CULPABLE
MENTALSTATEELEMENTFORBOTHBURGLARY
AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS CONSTITUTED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The State contends that Mr. Carrick's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
"because he has not shown either that all other competent counsel would have requested the
specific intent instruction or that he was prejudiced by the instruction's absence." See Brief
of Appellee, p. 32 et seq. This argument fails because it ignores critical aspects of the twoprong Strickland test and the essential importance that accurate jury instructions have on
criminal proceedings.
On appeal - jury instructions are reviewed under a correctness standard, with no
particular deference provided to the trial court. See Ong Int'/ (US.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave.

Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct.
10

App.1995), cert. denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). The appellate court must "review [the]
jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole,
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083, 1084
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 910 P.2d425 (Utah 1995). "Further, because "'[t]he general
rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential,"'
failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered
harmless." State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v.
Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061(Utah199l)(quotingState v. Roberts, 711P.3d235, 239 (Utah
1985) (alteration in original)). "The purpose of the instructions is to set forth the issues and
the law applicable thereto in a clear, concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will
understand how to discharge its responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah
1980).
To convict Mr. Carrick of Burglary or the lesser-included-offense of Criminal
Trespass, the State was required to prove every element, including the culpable mental state
for each charge. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 ( 1) ("A defendant in a criminal proceeding
is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt .... "). Here, Instruction No. 26 informed the jury that before
Mr. Carrick may be found guilty of a crime the evidence must prove "that the defendant
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged ... and that the defendant committed

11

such conduct with the culpable mental state required for each offense." (R. 120).6
According to the Instruction, "The culpable mental state required is intentionally, or
knowingly, or recklessly." (Id.). Instruction No. 28 provides the definition for the culpable
mental state of "knowingly" that mirrors the statutory definition found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(2) (R. 122). The jury instructions - however - are devoid of any definition
regarding the culpable mental state required for either Burglary or Criminal Trespass.
Instructions 26 and 28 are wholly insufficient as culpable mental state instructions
even when read in light of all other instructions. The definition in Instruction No. 28 is not
applicable to the culpable mental state required for either Burglary or Criminal Trespass,
namely, "intentionally" and "recklessly." See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(1) and (3). This
manner of instruction confused rather than enlightened the jury, since it concerns terms
nowhere else defined in the Jury Instructions. "The conclusion is inescapable that the jury
instructions, taken as a whole, did not fairly instruct the jury" on the culpable mental state
for Burglary or Criminal Trespass. See State v. Stringham, 957 P .2d 602, 609 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
In Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court established a two-prong test for determining when a defendant's Sixth

A true and correct copy of the Jury Instructions, R. 93-129, is attached to the Brief
of Appellant as Addendum I.
6

12

Amendment7 right to the effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104
S.Ct. at 2064. The test- adopted by Utah courts-requires a defendant to show "first, that
his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and,
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT
12, ~ 16, 26 P.3d 203; Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Stidham,
2014 UT App 32, ~ 18, 320 P.3d 696; State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App.
1995); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he right to the
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect
it has on the ability of the accused to receive 8: fair trial." See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must "'identify the acts or
omissions' which, under the circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard ofreasonableness. "' State v. Templin, 805 P .2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A
defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P .2d 15 5,
159-60 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

7

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
13

To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a defendant must proffer
sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. "A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871P.2d516, 522 (Utah), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
In light of the circumstances of this case, it is difficult - if not impossible - to
conceive of a sound trial strategy that would justify trial counsel's decision to remain
completely silent concerning the court's failure to accurately instruct the jury as to the
culpable mental state for both Burglary and the lesser-included-offense of Criminal
Trespass. Based on the issues surrounding Mr. Carrick's lack ofintent to commit theft, not
to mention the "reckless" mental state issue, trial counsel should have objected to the lack
of instruction. By failing to do so, not only did trial counsel fail to conduct the defense in
manner consistent with the theory of the case, but he also failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. See and cf State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,

iJ 26, 321 P.3d 1136. Hence, trial

counsel's decision - according to Strickland- constituted deficient performance and cannot
be considered "sound trial strategy."
According to the State, the '"relevant question under Strickland' is whether 'no
competent attorney' would have done the same." See Brief of Appellee, p. 35 (quoting
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Premov.Moore,562U.S.115, 124, 131S.Ct.733(2011)).8 Basedonthegeneralprinciple
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential to the jury
discharging its responsibilities, no competent attorney would have failed to request the
appropriate instructions as to the mental state elements of Burglary and Criminal Trespass.
This goes to the very core of what is '"constitutionally compelled" under the Sixth
Amendment. See Chandler v. United States, 218 F .3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114 (1987)).
But for counsel's unprofessional failure to object, the result of Mr. Carrick's jury
trial would have been different. Had the trial court been alerted of its obligation, there is
a reasonable probability that the jury, having been properly instructed, would have acquitted
Mr. Carrick of Burglary or at least convicted him of the lesser-included-offense of Criminal
Trespass. The prejudice to Mr. Carrick resulting from this critical failure is evinced by the
fact that the jury was precluded for properly considering the appropriate culpable mental
state of the applicable offenses. In other words, the likelihood of a different result is
substantial-notjust conceivable. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131, S.Ct.
770 (2011).

The Court, in Premo, addressed a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to
move to suppress a confession prior to advising the defendant to plead no contest to
felony murder in exchange for the minimum sentence for that offense notwithstanding a
full confession to two witnesses. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 119-20, 131 S.Ct.
733 (2011). This is significantly different than the instant case, which involves the failure
to request jury instructions on the essential intent elements of the charges.
8
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IV.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS BOTH
BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL MERITS REVERSAL
OF MR. CARRICK'S CONVICTION OF BURGLARY.

Contrary to the State's assertion, the cumulative effect of the numerous errors in this
case, including the ineffective assistance of counsel both before and during trial, 9
prejudiced Mr. Carrick, which undermines confidence that a fair trial was provided to him.
As a result, under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court should reverse Mr. Carrick's
conviction because the cumulative effect of several errors undermines confidence that a fair
trial was had. See State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68,, 99, 322 P.3d 624 (stating cumulative error
doctrine is "used when a single error may not constitute grounds for reversal, but many
errors, when taken collectively, nonetheless undermine confidence in the fairness of a
trial").

V.

THE STATE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY REBUT
MR. CARRICK'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE

See Mr. Carrick's previously filed a Rule 23B Motion, which the Court- by
Order dated April 20, 2017 - deferred for consideration with the briefing in this case.
The Rule 23B Motion raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
including trial counsel's failure to investigate and utilize an eyewitness identification
expert at trial, trial counsel's failure to investigate and engage a forensic investigations
expert concerning the critical failures of the investigating officer to follow standard CSI
practices in his investigation of the case, and trial counsel's failure to investigate critical
alibi witnesses.
9
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ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL RAISED IN HIS RULE 23B
MOTION.

The State - by way of its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Rule 23B
Remand - failed to substantively rebut Mr. Carrick's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Memorandum is noticeably devoid of any expert affidavits or declarations
contradicting in any manner Mr. Carrick's expert witnesses Affidavits critical to the claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel not of record in the instant case. Perhaps most
noteworthy, is the State's failure to rebut the thoroughly investigated timeline, which
establishes that Mr. Carrick would have either arrived or had been arriving at Racks Barber
Shop at the time of the alleged Burglary. See Amended Second Affidavit of Robert V.
Welling in Support of Rule 23B Motion.
CONCLUSION

In light the foregoing in addition to that set forth in the Brief of Appellant and the
Rule 23B Motion, Mr. Carrick respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction
and remand the case for a new trial on the Burglary charge consistent with this Court's
instructions as set forth in its opinion. Mr. Carrick further requests that the Court provide
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him with any other remedy that the Court deems just and appropriate under the
circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nct day of December, 2017.
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
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ADDENDA
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(l 1).
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